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In March 2001, during ‘‘Le Race’’, a cycling event
that takes place in and around Christchurch on
New Zealand’s South Island, a competitor, Vanessa
Caldwell, died in a collision with a car. The per-
sonal tragedy of the Caldwell family was exacer-
bated when it was revealed that Mrs Caldwell had
learnt shortly before the event began that she was
pregnant. This apparently tragic accident was how-
ever to have ramifications far beyond its initial very
personal nexus.
The race in which Mrs Caldwell was competing
had first been staged in 1999 and had, in its short
history, become a well regarded part of the sporting
calendar in New Zealand, attracting over 1,000
competitors. It was organised by experienced event
organiser, Mrs Astrid Andersen, who therefore took
ultimate responsibility for participant safety in the
event.
The race was held in March 2001 and Vanessa
Caldwell was competing as part of a four person
team. Mrs Caldwell was to cycle the final leg of the
event along the Summit Road (a narrow stretch of
the highway), and then onto the finish at Akaroa.
Mrs Caldwell had moved over onto the ‘‘wrong’’
side of the road whilst she was passing other com-
petitors and was hit by the oncoming vehicle, kill-
ing her and her unborn child.
Mrs Andersen (the event organiser) had told race
entrants that there would be an ‘‘official road clo-
sure’’ on that particular stretch of road. At the
safety briefing before the race, which took place in
the main city square in Christchurch, Mrs Andersen
described the provisions put in place for the section
of the race that would take place along the Summit
Road2:
‘‘There is an official road closure on the Sum-
mit Road, and unless you are officially entered
in Le Race you will not get through. Now if
you have a rogue cyclist in your bunch, the
whole bunch will be stopped, so it’s up to you
to check who’s cycling around and make
sure . . . ’’
What she actually had put in place at that point was
a checkpoint, rather than a road closure, which cov-
ered just 200m of the Summit Road section. It is
clear that this checkpoint served as an adminis-
trative rather than a safety procedure, its predomi-
nant purpose being to prevent unregistered cyclists
from taking part in the race, a conclusion strength-
ened by the notice that appeared in the local news-
paper, the Christchurch Press, prior to the event.
This was reported in Court in the following man-
ner3:
‘‘The public notice stated that the temporary
closure was ‘to provide a cycle race control
point during the holding of a cycling event
from Christchurch to Akaroa’, and it contained
the following further information: ‘Residents,
visitors and motor vehicles will be permitted to
pass through the control point during the
period of the proposed closure. Cyclists who
are not participating in the cycle race will be
asked to wait until the temporary closure has
ended’.’’
There is ambiguity in this statement. On the one
hand there is reference to ‘‘road closure’’. On the
other hand, it is implied that the road will be open
to other ‘‘non-race’’ vehicles. It was that ambiguity
which was to cost Mrs Caldwell her life and pro-
vided the basis upon which Mrs Andersen was
prosecuted.
The Court saw the issue of the alleged ambiguity
and lack of clarity of the safety information pre-
sented by Mrs Andersen as being of crucial impor-
tance to the case. It was pointed out by the Court
that4:
‘‘On my assessment of all the evidential mate-
rial, in my view there is evidence on which a
reasonable jury could be satisfied that the pre-
race written material which Mrs Andersen sup-
plied to entrants in Le Race was not clear and
unambiguous . . . Firstly, in all three relevant
documents, the entry form brochure, the pre-
race letter to competitors and the pre-race
information sheet, there were references to the
fact that support vehicles would not be
allowed on the Summit Road . . . Secondly, the
information sheet contained a specific refer-
ence to ‘an official road closure on the Summit
1. B.A. Hons, M.A. Law, Lecturer in law at Sheffield Hal-
lam University, England.
2. R. v Andersen [2003] D.C.R. 506 at para.[36].
3. ibid., at para.[62].
4. ibid., at para.[116].
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Road’ . . . Thirdly, the pre-race information
sheet did not differentiate between the two sec-
tions of the Summit Road.’’
Therefore the pre-race safety pack sent to the com-
petitors inadequately explained the safety proce-
dures in place for the event. In addition to the safety
material, there was also a pre-race briefing held in
Cathedral Square.5 This particular briefing was sim-
ilarly inadequate. The Court stated that6:
‘‘If any of the competitors or their supporters
were already under the misapprehension that
the Summit Road would be closed to other traf-
fic during the event, that statement during the
briefing would not have dispelled that
impression.’’
and concluded7:
‘‘It is clear that the state of the evidence is such
that a jury would be entitled to conclude that
the information which was given by Mrs
Andersen to competitors in Le Race 2001
regarding the status of the Summit Road was
not clear and was ambiguous.’’
The safety instructions are the single most impor-
tant material that the organiser of any event must
draw to the attention of all those taking part in that
event. It is also of crucial importance that the com-
petitors are given ample time to assimilate this
information in an appropriate environment. This is
a further area where the provision provided by Mrs
Andersen was fatally flawed. The start point of the
race, Cathedral Square, with all the accompanying
excitement and hubbub was clearly an unsuitable
venue at which to discuss safety provisions.
The start itself is a time when the attention of
participants would not be on the organiser.
This issue was discussed at some length in the
Canadian case, Smith v Horizon Aero Sports Ltd,8
where the duty upon a parachute instructor to
ensure the assimilated learning of safe jumping
technique was of crucial importance. In this case,
the plaintiff, making her first parachute jump sued
with respect to injuries she received after she
landed in and then fell from the tree, breaking her
back and rendering her paraplegic. She alleged that
insufficient checks were carried out to establish that
the appropriate information given had been under-
stood and more importantly fully retained by the
students. The Court drew attention to the impor-
tance of taking extra care when imparting crucial
safety information in a stressful environment.
Expert witnesses testified concerning the considera-
tions that must be taken into account where the
individual may be under stress. Spencer J.
reported9:
‘‘Both experts testified that stress enhances per-
formance until an optimum stress point is
reached and that beyond that point perform-
ance deteriorates rapidly . . . I accept the evi-
dence of Dr Fenz and Dr Craig,10 however, that
care is needed to ensure the anxious student
absorbs what is being taught and that stress
under which they labour may inhibit both the
initial learning process and the recall and per-
formance of what has been learned when it is
needed . . . The level of stress and degree to
which it inhibits the student will differ from
person to person.’’
The implications of this analysis are obvious. Clear,
unambiguous instructions delivered in a less fre-
netic atmosphere may well have saved Mrs Cald-
well’s life and would certainly have exonerated Mrs
Andersen from all liability.
Furthermore, Mrs Andersen had good reason to
realise that her failure to provide unambiguous
information could prove catastrophic for the com-
petitors. Abbott J.T.M. stated11:
‘‘A reasonable jury could infer that Mrs
Andersen knew, or at least would have known
if she turned her mind to it, that ambiguous or
misleading information regarding the status of
the roads on the course for Le Race could cause
danger to participating cyclists, in particular if
that information led them to believe that a sec-
tion or both sections of the Summit Road
would be closed to other traffic when that was
in fact not the case.’’
It is not in dispute that as race director, it was Mrs
Andersen who had primary responsibility for
insuring the safety of competitors. The nature of the
duty owed by Mrs Andersen to the competitors can
be equated to that owed by the British Board of
Boxing Control (‘‘BBBC’’) to Michael Watson (and
indeed all boxers), who fight under their auspices.
In that particular case,12 it was held:
‘‘Since the claimant belonged to a class of per-
sons within contemplation of the board, which
5. Cathedral Square is the main square in Christchurch
from where the race began.
6. R. v Andersen, cited above, at para.[127].
7. ibid., at para.[131].
8. Smith v Horizon Aero Sports Ltd, 130 D.L.R. (3d) 91; 1981
Carswell B.C. 581.
9. Smith v Horizon Aero Sports Ltd, 130 D.L.R. (3d) 91 at p.7
of transcript.
10. Two expert witnesses in that particular case.
11. R. v Andersen, cited above, at para.[144].
12. Watson v BBBC Ltd [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1256.
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was itself involved in an activity which gave it
complete control over and a responsibility for a
boxing contest which would be liable to result
in injury to the claimant if reasonable care were
not exercised by the board, it was fair just and
reasonable to impose a duty on the board.’’
It is not unknown for cyclists to perish whilst com-
peting in races (note the periodic fatalities in the
Tour de France or other high profile cycling events
for example). Indeed, this fact was acknowledged
by Mrs Andersen in an interview a short while
before she was sentenced, when she stated13: ‘‘With
cycling, there’s always a chance someone will get
killed. You never want someone to die or be badly
injured on one of your events.’’
However, what was different about this partic-
ular death was the legal process which followed.
Mrs Andersen was charged, and ultimately found
guilty of criminal nuisance, under s.145 of the
Crimes Act 1961, in relation to Mrs Caldwell’s
death.14 This was not a civil action brought by Mrs
Caldwell’s family, for New Zealand’s Accident
Compensation Scheme15 bars legal proceedings in
the event of personal injury except in certain cases
where exemplary damages are sought, in such a
case recklessness must be found to establish liability.
Rather this was a criminal action with Mrs
Andersen being found guilty by a collection of her
peers on a charge of criminal nuisance.
The decision of the Christchurch District Court16
sent shockwaves through the New Zealand sport-
ing community, a country which prides itself on its
provision of outdoor sporting events and which
until now has been ill-used to the interference of the
law into incidents which take place within the
sporting environment. The reaction of the commu-
nity to the case has by and large been unfortunately
predictable, with participants and organisers
almost as one predicting dire consequences for all
sports organisation in New Zealand. For example,
Mike Ward, Green Party Member of Parliament and
organiser of several high profile sporting events
stated in the wake of the decision17:
‘‘As organiser of New Zealand’s longest run-
ning multi-sports event, the Nelson Iron Peo-
ple Race, I am unlikely to proceed with next
year’s event. I imagine others will feel the
same, which is sad in view of the exceptional
safety record for events where there is in reality
considerable scope for things to go wrong.
As has been pointed out by others, this case
is not just about higher-risk sporting activities.
It affects every sporting, recreational, or cul-
tural event in this country.’’
That the many doomsayers should now be predict-
ing the demise of the multitude of sporting events
which in particular have prospered in New Zealand
is ironic. For these events have in no small part been
protected by the existence of the Accident Com-
pensation Scheme in New Zealand, which for the
most part prohibits legal action to recover com-
pensation in the event of personal injury. In other
common law countries, the spectre of negligence
liability, in the event of personal injury, is a constant
worry for any event organiser. But where previ-
ously the civil law has been kept at bay by the ACC,
now the criminal law apparently threatens the
status of these events. Already it has affected orga-
nisers of outdoor sporting activities, with Cycling
Timaru (based on New Zealand’s South Island) can-
celling an historic 106-year-old event due appar-
ently to the mountain of paperwork and logistical
difficulties involved. The Christchurch Press
reported the news18:
‘‘Cycling Timaru has been forced to cancel a
(sic) historic 106-year-old event in the wake of
the landmark prosecution of Le Race director
Astrid Andersen. Next month’s annual Christ-
church to Timaru race has been shelved after
concerns were raised about safety and the
problems posed by a ‘paper war’ to gain race
approvals. Cycling Timaru president Brent Coe
said it was not easy to pull the plug on an event
that started in 1897. ‘They want 42 marshals, 95
signs, and 147 cones on the course which is
impossible for us’.’’
From a neutral perspective, these requirements do
not seem to be particularly excessive in a race
which will be covering around 163 kilometres (100
miles)! This article will attempt to address the con-
cerns voiced by people such as Mike Green and to
assess to what extent their fears are realistic ones
when the legal implications of the Andersen deci-
sion19 are correctly understood. It will also seek to
analyse this case from an English common law per-
spective and to try and examine what impact such
an incident would have, if it was litigated in Eng-
land and Wales.
13. K. Welham, ‘‘Crossroads for Race Manager’’, The
Christchurch Press, August 9, 2003, p.A4.
14. Mrs Andersen has been remanded on bail and is
awaiting sentence on August 29—her sentence was a fine of
NZ$10,000, (around £3,500).
15. The Scheme is administered by the Accident Com-
pensation Commission (‘‘ACC’’) and is commonly referred
to as ACC.
16. R. v Andersen, cited above, May 19, 2003.
17. Christchurch Press, August 9, 2003, p.A1. Press release,
Green Party, August 10, 2003.
18. ‘‘In Brief’’, Christchurch Press, August 22, 2003, p.A3
(New Zealand Press Association).
19. R. v Andersen, cited above.
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In order to understand the reasoning behind this
decision, it is necessary to examine the little used
area of criminal nuisance in New Zealand. There
have been two landmark cases, in this area, R. v
Mwai20 and R. v Turner.21 In the first of these cases,
the appellant had unprotected sexual intercourse
with five women at a time when he was infected
with the HIV virus, causing two of them to become
infected with the condition.22 Amongst several
charges levelled was that of criminal nuisance, con-
trary to s.145 of the Crimes Act 1961. The particular
provision contained in s.145(1) reading:
‘‘Every one commits criminal nuisance who
does any unlawful act or omits to discharge
any legal duty, such act or omission being one
which he knew would endanger the lives,
safety, or health of the public, or the life, safety,
or health of an individual.’’
The penalty for any breach of s.145(1) is contained
in s.145(2), which reads further: ‘‘Everyone who
commits criminal nuisance is liable to imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding one year.’’
The legal duty owed in relation to a charge of
criminal nuisance, is covered by s.156 of the Crimes
Act, which states:
‘‘Every one who has in his charge or under his
control anything whatever, whether animate or
inanimate, or who erects, makes, operates, or
maintains anything whatever, which, in the
absence of precaution or care, may endanger
human life is under a legal duty to take reason-
able precautions against and to use reasonable
care to avoid such danger, and is criminally
responsible for the consequences of omitting
without lawful excuse to discharge that
duty.’’
The appellant in R. v Mwai23 contended that there
could be no liability as it could not be proved that
the HIV virus was under his control. However, as
stated in Mwai, and reiterated in Andersen,24 the
Court expressed the opinion that25:
‘‘This is really no more than a particular aspect
of the more general common law duty not to
engage in conduct which one can foresee may
expose others to harm.’’
Based upon this particular assessment of the statu-
tory provision, it was clear that the appellant had
under his control the seminal fluid infected with the
HIV virus, and that he could foresee that unpro-
tected sexual intercourse with the women would
indeed expose them to harm. In order to prove
guilt, the Crown only had to show that the appel-
lant put the complainants in peril, or at risk of con-
tracting HIV, which obviously they could
accomplish without difficulty.26
It can clearly be seen that when applying this
scenario to the case in hand, Astrid Andersen, as
Race Director had the safety provision of the race
under her control and that it was possible to foresee
that if that provision was ambiguous or unclear,
then this would be sufficient to expose all the com-
petitors in the race to harm, (or at least potential
harm). Therefore, in order to gain a conviction, the
prosecution had only to show that the safety
instructions were indeed flawed in the manner out-
lined above.
In R. v Turner,27 the appellants, the managing
director and general manager of a mussel process-
ing factory, were convicted of criminal nuisance fol-
lowing the contamination of some mussels from the
plant with the listeria bacteria. These mussels were
subsequently sold through retail outlets causing
serious illness amongst those members of the pub-
lic who ate the contaminated products. The defence
contended that the mussel processing plant could
not be classified within the confines of s.156 of the
Crimes Act 1961, which, to reiterate, stated:
‘‘Every one who has in his charge or under his
control anything whatever, whether animate
or inanimate, or who erects, makes, operates,
or maintains anything whatever, which, in
the absence of precaution or care, may endan-
ger human life is under a legal duty to take
reasonable precautions against and to use rea-
sonable care to avoid such danger.’’28
The defence claimed that the mussel processing
plant did not fit within the definition of ‘‘anything
whatever’’ and on the basis submitted there could
be no guilty verdict. However, the Court of Appeal
gave short shrift to this argument, contending
that29:
‘‘The phrase ‘anything whatever’ has, in our
view, been deliberately chosen as a phrase of
20. [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 149.
21. (1995) 13 C.R.N.Z. 142.
22. It is interesting to note that in a case decided recently,
Mohammed Dica became the first person in England to be
successfully prosecuted for inflicting grievous bodily harm
in connection with a sexual disease. In this particular case,
he tricked two women into having unprotected sexual
intercourse with him even though he knew that he had
been diagnosed with HIV.
23. [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 149.
24. [2003] D.C.R. 506.
25. ibid., p.8 of transcript.
26. ibid., p.7 of transcript.
27. (1995) 13 C.R.N.Z. 142.
28. Emphasis added.
29. At p.149.
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wide import. This is emphasised by ‘what-
ever’. The only qualification to the phrase is
that to be within the section it must be ‘any-
thing whatever’ which, in the absence of pre-
caution or care, ‘may endanger human life’.
Qualified in that way, the phrase is apt to
describe for example a metal quarry, a hospital
theatre or a factory that produces food for
human consumption.’’
Having clarified in R. v Turner that a manufacturing
plant would therefore fall within the jurisdiction of
the Crimes Act 1961, the Court in R. v Andersen30
felt no difficulty in extending the decision so as to
include an organised cycling event within the
boundaries of the definition stated in s.156 of the
Crimes Act. The Court stated31:
‘‘In my view there is no logical basis on which
an organised cycling event on public roads
should not come within the definition of ‘any-
thing whatever’ in s.156 . . . If a mussel proc-
essing factory, (i.e. a building within which a
number of different processes may be under-
taken at different times by different people) can
be ‘anything whatever’, there is no reason why
the phrase should not also include a racecourse
or a cycling velodrome. If a racing or cycling
club owns or leases or has a licence to use
premises for its activities, there is no reason
why the organisation of such activities should
not be governed by s.156. There is certainly no
reason why such premises should not be ‘any-
thing whatever’, while a mussel processing
factory and fluid within one’s own body
are.’’
The Court continued in the same vein32:
‘‘If the officers of a racing club decide not to
cancel racing when the weather conditions ren-
der the course unsafe, there is no logical reason
why s.156 should not apply. Secondly, if the
organisers of a race meeting on a public beach
make a similar decision, knowing that the sand
is unstable and therefore dangerous to horses
and jockeys, there is equally no reason why
s.156 should not apply. Finally, if a bungy jump
operator could be prosecuted for criminal nui-
sance because his equipment is faulty and
potentially dangerous, there is no logical rea-
son why the organiser of a cycle race should
not be prosecuted if his or her planning of the
event has been defective and if, as a result, the
safety of competitors is put at risk.’’
When examined from this point of view, Mrs
Andersen was clearly going to encounter substan-
tial problems in securing an acquittal. It was the
control of the event per se that was established to be
of crucial importance, rather than the control of the
individual competitors in taking part in the event.
As was pointed out in Court, Mrs Andersen
accepted all entry fees and retained the right to alter
the course or even cancel the event, with no right of
redress for any of the competitors. In addition, she
retained the right to disqualify any competitor who
broke the stated rules of the event.33 This point was
addressed at length by the Court, which stated:34
‘‘Mrs Andersen’s intention to retain control
over the event while it was in progress was put
into effect. There was a checkpoint on the
Christchurch section of the Summit Road near
the Sign of the Bellbird, the purpose of which
was to identify rogue cyclists who had not paid
an entry fee. There were cones and marshals at
the change stations at Motukarara, Little River
and the Hill Top . . . In such a situation the
competitor could be removed from the event
which was the activity which was under Mrs
Andersen’s control. Conversely, in the absence
of any fault on her part, Mrs Andersen would
not be personally liable for any irresponsible
conduct by a competitor.’’
Criticism has been extended to Mrs Caldwell for
her catastrophic failure to observe the ordinary
laws of the road. When she was involved in the
fatal collision, she was at least a metre beyond the
central line of the road. If she had been following
the ordinary laws of the highway, then the collision
would never have happened. However, as was
pointed out by several witnesses who had been
competitors in the race, they too had misunder-
stood the safety instructions furnished by Mrs
Andersen and believed that the stretch of road in
which the accident happened was closed for the
duration of the race, so that it was indeed safe to
use the entire width of the highway rather than
merely one side of the road. Despite this, the
defence attempted to lay responsibility for her
actions squarely at the feet of Mrs Caldwell.35
Counsel for the defence submitted:
‘‘The structure of the event and the administra-
tion may remain with the race organiser, but
from the moment the race begins, each individ-
ual competitor begins their own act of practis-
ing that sport. They alone are in control of their
actions from that time, within the rules and
30. [2003] D.C.R. 506.
31. ibid., at paras [85], [90].
32. ibid., at para.[91].
33. ibid., at para.[95].
34. ibid., at paras [96]–[97].
35. ibid., at para.[79].
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guidelines provided by the event, and they
alone are individually responsible for the way
they will ride the race.’’
However, in light of the unclear and ambiguous
safety instructions furnished by Mrs Andersen, the
fact that Mrs Caldwell was apparently riding in
violation of the normal laws of the road is immate-
rial. It was perfectly reasonable for Mrs Caldwell to
believe that it was safe for her to cross the white line
in the manner that she did. She had no reason to
foresee that there would be any vehicles on the
road, other than the bicycles which she was racing
with and against. No blame could thus be attached
to Mrs Caldwell. She behaved at all times in a
responsible and reasonable manner.
This verdict should not open any floodgates. It
will only be of concern to the imprudent orga-
niser.
England and Wales perspective
This section, although addressing briefly the possi-
ble implications from any hypothetical criminal
prosecution in this country will however concen-
trate on the possibility of an action in negligence,
had the event taken place in England or Wales.
Although the charge and outcome may be different
in the event of a criminal prosecution in England
and Wales, the fundamental principles are closely
linked. By contrast it is in the area of a possible
negligence action where the differences between
the two jurisdictions are most starkly illustrated.
It is likely that for any action to proceed in crimi-
nal law in England and Wales, in the case in hand,
it would be under a charge of either gross negligence
manslaughter or reckless manslaughter. This would
therefore hinge on whether or not Mrs Andersen
was in the one case grossly negligent, or in the other
case reckless, in the care she attached to the safety
provision in the race. In order for her to be guilty of
gross negligence manslaughter, it would have to be
shown that Mrs Andersen owed Mrs Caldwell a
duty of care, that she had breached that duty of
care, that this breach had caused the death of Mrs
Caldwell and that this breach could be character-
ised as grossly negligent, that being an objective
test.36 Now duty and causation would be easily
established. However, it is more doubtful whether
Mrs Andersen exhibited a sufficient lack of care to
be in breach of duty. MacKay L.C. commented on
the appropriate standard to be applied37:
‘‘In cases of manslaughter by criminal negli-
gence involving a breach of duty, it is a suffi-
cient direction to the jury to adopt the gross
negligence test set out by the Court of Appeal
in the present case following R v Bateman
(1925) 19 Cr App R 8 and Andrews v DPP [1937]
2 All ER 552 . . . and it is not necessary to refer
to the definition of recklessness in R v Lawrence
[1981] 1 All ER 974, [1982] AC 510, although it
is perfectly open to the trial judge to use the
word ‘reckless’ in its ordinary meaning as part
of his exposition of the law if he deems it
appropriate in the circumstances of the partic-
ular case.’’
In assessing the appropriate standard to be grossly
negligent in Adomako,38 MacKay L.C. drew attention
to the influence of older cases in supporting the
judgment. In R. v Bateman,39 Lord Hewart C.J.
commented:
‘‘The facts must be such that in the opinion of
a jury the negligence of the accused went
beyond a mere matter of compensation
between subjects and showed such disregard
for the life and safety of others as to amount to
a crime against the state and conduct deserving
punishment.’’
The question that would need to be addressed
therefore is whether or not Mrs Andersen was so
grossly negligent as to be deserving of criminal sanc-
tion. Factors which may be considered in that con-
text include the seriousness of her breach of care,
the extent to which that breach departed from the
proper standard of care and also the risk of death
due to the breach of care. When all of these factors
are taken into account and the question of Mrs
Andersen’s guilt or otherwise of gross negligence
manslaughter is addressed, it appears, in the light
of the case law that she would not be found guilty
of such a charge.
As regards subjective reckless manslaughter and, the
necessary standard of behaviour is as Smith and
Hogan explain40:
‘‘Where [the defendant] kills by an act (not
unlawful apart from the fact that it is done
recklessly) knowing that it is highly probable
that he will cause serious bodily harm . . . it
must be manslaughter.’’
Mrs Andersen must have realised that had she
failed to furnish clear unambiguous safety instruc-
tions that this failure would certainly have the
potential to cause serious bodily harm or death.
However, it is far more doubtful that her behaviour
could possibly be classified as reckless. This writer
36. R. v Adomako [1994] 1 A.C. 171.
37. ibid., at 188.
38. See n.36 above.
39. (1925) 19 Cr. App. R. 8 at p.12 of transcript.
40. J.C. Smith, Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law (10th ed.,
Butterworths, London, 2002), p.387.
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believes that at worst, her actions could be
described as careless, leaving the criminal law in
England and Wales an unsuitable mechanism for
further action. It has been clearly stated in various
dicta that mere inadvertence is not sufficient for a
guilty verdict, and whilst Mrs Andersen may have
been careless it would be harsh in the extreme to
suggest that her conduct amounted to anything
more than mere carelessness, and that therefore this
would be insufficient to lead to a successful convic-
tion under gross negligence manslaughter or reck-
less manslaughter. Indeed it is for analogous
reasons that there will almost certainly be no action
taken by Mrs Caldwell’s family to attempt to
recover exemplary damages under New Zealand’s
Accident Compensation Scheme. The appropriate
standard to be applied in that scenario is recklessness
(albeit objective, rather than subjective).
Since the 1967 Woodhouse Report41; and the
resultant legislation which enshrined most of its
recommendations into New Zealand law with the
enactment and subsequent amendment of the Acci-
dent Compensation Act 1972; an action to recover
damages for personal injury in New Zealand has
not been available where that injury falls within the
ambit of the Act. The latest incarnation of the legis-
lation covering what became identified as the social
compact set up between the New Zealand people
and their government is the Injury Prevention,
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001. The
major point of interest lies in the elimination of the
right to sue for personal injury, which was estab-
lished by the compensation scheme in the original
statute, in 1972, and maintained in all subsequent
enactments. Thus, where personal injury is suf-
fered, there can be no action in negligence unless
exemplary damages are sought. In such a scenario, the
claimant must show that the defendant was grossly
negligent or reckless as to the safety of the claim-
ant.
In A v Bottrill,42 a claimant contracted cervical
cancer after the misreading of her smear tests by the
defendant. The majority in the Privy Council
reversed the earlier majority decision of the New
Zealand Court of Appeal,43 and held that the appro-
priate standard should be objective recklessness,
rather than subjective recklessness. It is unlikely, for
reasons given earlier, that any such action, even if
brought against Mrs Andersen, would have any
chance of succeeding in New Zealand. If such an
incident had happened in England or Wales, how-
ever, there would be no such bar on an action for
compensatory damages and any such action could
proceed in negligence.
The first duty of any sports organiser is to ensure
that there is appropriate safety provision at the
event in question. The event organiser clearly owes
the participants a duty of care to ensure this.44 In
some respects this requirement may be equated
with the responsibility of employers or occupiers of
premises, who must ensure that systems of work or
their premises are safe for the purposes for which
they are designed.
The principle that sports organisers must have
adequate safety procedures and systems in place
was most emphatically aired in Watson v British
Boxing Board of Control Ltd.45 In this particular case,
Michael Watson suffered catastrophic brain injuries
in a World title fight against Chris Eubank on Sep-
tember 21, 1991. From the point of the conclusion of
the fight, (when Watson was bludgeoned uncon-
scious to the canvas by his opponent), seven min-
utes elapsed before he was examined by the
attending doctors, who, it subsequently emerged,
lacked experience in dealing with brain trauma and
resuscitation. In addition they were not in posses-
sion of the appropriate equipment to deal with Wat-
son’s injuries, which were of a kind which could
reasonably be expected to occur in a boxing match,
and therefore should have been accounted for by
any reasonable organiser, or in this case, governing
body. A further 23 minutes elapsed before Watson
arrived at North Middlesex Hospital. However, the
lack of a neurosurgical department at that hospital
necessitated his transfer to St Bartholomew’s Hos-
pital, where an operation was carried out to evacu-
ate a subdural haematoma (a blood clot in the
brain). Unfortunately, by this time Watson had suf-
fered serious brain damage and it is due to these
injuries and what he viewed as serious flaws in the
safety provisions put in place by the governing
body that he brought his case. As Lord Phillips M.R.
explained46:
‘‘He, (Mr Watson), claimed that the board had
been under a duty of care to see that all reason-
able steps were taken to ensure that he
received immediate and effective medical
attention and treatment should he sustain
injury in the fight. He contended that they
were in breach of this duty with the conse-
quence that he did not receive the immediate
medical attention at the ringside that his condi-
tion required.’’
41. The Royal Commission of Inquiry—‘‘Compensation
for Personal Injury in New Zealand’’ (December 1967)—
became better known as the Woodhouse Report after the
Commission Chairman.
42. Privy Council Appeal No.10 of 2002; [2002] UKPC 44;
[2002] 3 W.L.R. 1406.
43. Bottrill v A [2001] 3 N.Z.L.R. 622.
44. Based on Caparo v Dickman, there would be no doubt
that a duty is owed—issues of proximity, forseeability and
that it is just and reasonable are all clearly satisfied.
45. [2001] Q.B. 1134.
46. ibid., at 1141.
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The Board was found to have failed to ensure that
its rules provided for adequate medical supervi-
sion, which would have meant, had it been present,
that Mr Watson would have received the appro-
priate medical care for what was clearly, under the
circumstances, a foreseeable injury. Lord Phillips
M.R. continued47:
‘‘The injuries which are sustained by profes-
sional boxers are the foreseeable, indeed inevi-
table, consequence of an activity which the
board sponsors, encourages and controls. . . .
As Mr Morris48 accepted, by reason of its con-
trol over boxing the board was in a position to
determine, and did in fact determine, the meas-
ures that were taken in boxing to protect and
promote the health and safety of boxers.’’
It was held that it was reasonable for Mr Watson to
rely on the board to look after his safety adequately
and that the board, in failing to institute appro-
priate safety protocol should be held liable for the
injuries that Mr Watson received at the hands of Mr
Eubank. Now clearly, this can be applied directly to
Mrs Andersen. It is reasonable for the cycle race
competitors to rely on her, as race organiser, to look
after their safety appropriately. It is also reasonable
for them to expect there to be adequate safety pro-
tocol in place—and part of that necessary safety
protocol is obviously the provision of clear and
unambiguous safety instructions. Lord Phillips
M.R., spoke in Watson about the importance of the
British Board having ‘‘control’’ over boxing in gen-
eral and that event in particular. This can be
equated to the notion of Mrs Andersen’s ‘‘control’’
over her event and that the duty she owed was
extended due to this notion of control.
The Andersen and Watson decisions might on one
view open the floodgates to challenges to the gov-
erning bodies from sports competitors injured dur-
ing the course of their sports. Particularly
vulnerable would seem to be those governing bod-
ies that provide directions for safety provision
within their sports (such as Rugby Union via the
International Rugby Board and Formula One via
the Federation International Automobile). James M.
commenting on this issue writes49:
‘‘Potentially more dramatic for sport would be
the possibility that liability could be imposed
on a governing body for the inadequacy of its
in-game safety rules. Where a specific injury, or
injury from a specific act was a common occur-
rence in a sport, it is now possible that a gov-
erning body will be liable for such injuries as
are so caused. The court in Watson held that
one of the reasons why governing bodies exist
is to provide guidance, conduct and dissem-
inate research and educate all those involved in
its sport about safety issues. If it is known that
stamping in rugby, or elbowing in football, or
bouncers in cricket are dangerous and can
cause injury unless the rules are either changed
or more rigorously enforced, an incremental
development of the law from Watson would see
governing bodies liable for their failure to
ensure the safety of their sport’s partici-
pants.’’
Astrid Andersen does not represent a governing
body. However, her role for the race in question
could clearly be equated to that of a governing
body in that she would have a direct responsibility
for participant safety. It was the risk of a collision
between competitors and other road users in the
absence of unambiguous instructions. As this was
an obvious danger, there is a heightened duty to
protect the participants from it.50 Furthermore, as
was acknowledged in court, a common practice in
cycle races is for competitors to use the whole road,
where they believe it is safe to do so. Mrs Caldwell
was not the only competitor who was under the
mistaken understanding that the particular stretch
of road was closed. It was reported that51:
‘‘Firstly, it is common for riders to be bunched
across the road, often a number abreast. Sec-
ondly, it is also common for cyclists to use all
the available roadway when they believe that it
is safe to do so, which means that crossing the
white line is a well-recognised phenomenon.’’
Mrs Andersen, as race director was holding herself
out as the individual with ultimate responsibility
for all matters concerning the event, including
safety. She therefore owed a duty to provide a rea-
sonable standard of care to all participants, just as a
St John’s Ambulance person, attending an event in
their medical capacity, would owe a duty of care to
those to whom they render first aid.52
In Gillon v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police,53 a
policewoman, who was in attendance at a football
match, was injured when a player accidentally col-
lided with her as he careered off the pitch. She
brought an action alleging that she should have
been instructed by her superiors to keep an eye out
for such dangers (she had actually been instructed
to keep her attention focussed on the crowd).
47. At 1161 (emphasis added).
48. Mr John Morris, President of the British Boxing Board
of Control at the time.
49. S. Gardiner et al., Sports Law (2nd ed., London, Cav-
endish Publishing, 2001), p.714.
50. Bolton v Stone [1951] A.C. 850.
51. At paras [47]–[48].
52. Cattley v St John’s Ambulance Brigade, 87 N.J. 1140
(1986), c.133, p.4 of transcript.
53. 1997 S.L.T. 1218.
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Although Mrs Gillon lost the case there are never-
theless important points to make in terms of its
implications for the case in hand. Johnston L.J. held
in Gillon that:
‘‘(1) That the risk of such an accident occurring
was so minimal that it was reasonable not to
take precautions against it.
(2) That in the circumstances any instruction by
the first defender to the pursuer to keep an eye
on the pitch would not have prevented the
accident from happening.’’
These findings can be contrasted with the case
under discussion. Mrs Caldwell was involved in an
accident that in the circumstances was entirely fore-
seeable and it was reasonable to take precautions
against such an accident from occurring. Whether
Mrs Caldwell would have taken any notice of
proper instructions could have been another issue
as McWilliams v Sir William Arrol54 demonstrated, if
it could have been shown that Mrs Caldwell was in
the habit of ignoring safety instructions, particu-
larly with regards to road etiquette then it may
have been possible for Mrs Andersen to escape lia-
bility despite the fact that her own instructions had
been inadequate and that this inadequacy had
caused Mrs Caldwell’s death. However, Mrs Cal-
dwell’s pregnancy suggested that she would have
been particularly careful in the race. This may have
dissuaded Mrs Andersen making any attempt to
use the Arrol case in her defence.
It is well established by authority,55 that the
greater the risk of an incident occurring then the
greater the steps need to be to guard against that
event. Furthermore, the greater the likelihood of
serious consequences, then there is a heightened
responsibility to guard against them.
This principle was developed in Bolton v Stone,
where a cricket ball was hit out of the ground and
struck a passer-by, causing injury.56 Lord Porter
stated ‘‘The quantum of danger must always be a
question of degree. It is not enough that there is a
remote possibility that injury may occur; the ques-
tion is, would a reasonable man anticipate it?’’
Lord Reid further opined on the same subject57:
‘‘In considering that matter I think that it
would be right to take into account not only
how remote is the chance that a person might
be struck but also how serious the conse-
quences are likely to be if a person is struck.’’
In the case at hand, it is obvious that there was, in
the event of unclear instructions with regards to the
possible closure of the particular stretch of road, a
foreseeable risk of riders colliding with motor vehi-
cles and moreover and in the event of a collision,
the likelihood that the consequences would be
potentially catastrophic for one or both of the par-
ties involved. In this respect therefore, the legal
implications for Mrs Andersen would be very seri-
ous indeed.
It is likely that the Andersen case, caused events
organisers to look again at their safety provision. It
is certainly arguable that if this is the end result,
then this will lead to improved safety provision. It
is also possible that the case will have a ‘‘chilling
effect’’ on participation rates as organisers become
concerned that they may end up facing criminal
charges if an accident occurs at one of their events,
and that consequently they may decide to with-
draw from sports and leisure organisation com-
pletely.58
So this case (and others like it)59 clearly represent
very much a double edged sword. On the one hand
any advance in safety provisions for people in any
walk of life including sports competitors should be
applauded. On the other hand it must be acknowl-
edged that sport constitutes a unique environment
and that the law should adapt to it.
Three recent cases from foreign jurisdictions shed
further light on the legal position of governing bod-
ies (and sports organisers in general) in the face of
negligence claims by participants. In the first, Ham-
stra v British Columbia Rugby Union,60 Mark Hamstra
broke his neck, consequently suffering permanent
quadriplegia, whilst playing in the front row of a
scrum, which collapsed in a match in 1986. He sued
the referee, his school and the British Columbia
Rugby Union (‘‘BCRU’’). In exonerating the Rugby
Union, Hollinrake J. rejected a submission from
counsel for the British Columbia Rugby Union that
the standard to be applied was that of a rescuer. He
stated61:
‘‘In my opinion the standard of care the law
imposes on the BCRU is a greater one than that
of a rescuer. In saying this I am not taking a
different view of that standard than Spencer J.
did in the Horizon Aerosport case.62 I think the
facts before me are different than in that
case . . . While I think that standard of care of
the BCRU in this case is higher than that of a
54. [1962] 1 All E.R. 623.
55. Bolton v Stone [1951] A.C. 850.
56. ibid., at 860.
57. ibid., at 866.
58. Anecdotal evidence, such as that outlined earlier,
already exists which suggests that organisers are reconsid-
ering their positions following the guilty verdict.
59. Hamstra v British Columbia Rugby Union, 16 A.C.W.S.
3d 352; Watson v British Boxing Board of Control Ltd [2001]
Q.B. 1134; Haylen v New South Wales Rugby Union Ltd [2002]
N.S.W.S.C. 114; Agar v Hyde; Agar v Worsley, 173 A.L.R.
665.
60. 1989 Carswell B.C. 619; 16 A.C.W.S. 3d 352.
61. ibid., at para.30.
62. Smith v Horizon Aero Sports Ltd, 130 D.L.R. (3d) 91.
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rescuer I do not think it is the standard of the
careful or prudent parent. I think the best way
to put it is that the BCRU owes a duty of care
to take reasonable care in all the circumstances,
those circumstances being that it is a voluntary
non-profit organisation that has taken upon
itself the promotion and organisation of the
game of rugby as a member of the governing
body in this country, the CRU.63 In my opinion
the standard of care it must exercise is more in
keeping with the standard of care that I have
found the law imposes on Rigby.’’64
The question of any liability of the governing body
was clearly affected by the availability of informa-
tion to them regarding the potential threat of seri-
ous neck injuries occurring in the kind of incident
that caused Mark Hamstra’s injuries. Similarly, Mrs
Andersen would have been well aware of the prac-
tice of cyclists to use the full width of available road
wherever they believe it to be safe, and therefore
this should have been an important consideration
in her mind when she was putting forward the
safety instructions. Although there had been a
memorandum from the Rugby Football Union in
England concerning safety issues surrounding the
set scrummage in rugby union, as far back as 1981
and experimental rules were being implemented in
New Zealand, designed to deal with the issues of
collapsed scrummages, the court was satisfied that
with all the information available to them, the
BCRU had acted reasonably. Hollinrake J. com-
mented65:
‘‘The degree of the standard of care must be com-
mensurate with the gravity of the risk. Here the
plaintiff asserts that the defendants all ought to
have known of the risk of a collapsed scrum in the
game of rugby leading to the very type of injury
suffered by the plaintiff. The knowledge, the plain-
tiff says, should carry with it a very high degree of
care. I am satisfied on the evidence before me that
those involved in the game of rugby in May 1986 in
British Columbia did not have before them, nor as
reasonable persons ought they to have had, suffi-
cient knowledge as to the risk of serious cervical
spine injury resulting from a collapsed scrum, to
factor that knowledge into an increased standard of
care. With a contact sport such as rugby, if one were
to pause and reflect upon it, the possibility of a
serious neck injury is there. However, in my opin-
ion, on the basis of what the defendants knew or
ought to have known in May 1986, that possibility
was sufficiently remote that it did not require a
warning to the players or their parents from any of
the defendants, nor has it any significance to the
standard of care to be exercised by them.’’
Significantly however, the court reaffirmed the duty
of governing bodies to keep abreast of medical and
scientific evidence and to alter their laws and proce-
dures accordingly if safety necessitates this. Hollin-
rake J. concluded66:
‘‘The evidence shows that the rugby commu-
nity’s awareness of serious cervical spine
injury is now much greater than it was prior to
the plaintiff’s injury. I want to make it clear in
these reasons that the standard of care as it
relates to the risk of serious debilitating cervi-
cal spinal injury in B.C. in May 1986, is in my
opinion, a lower one than the court would
apply in B.C. were the same injury to occur
today in similar circumstances.’’
So had the court concluded that the relevant safety
information had been reasonably available to the
defendant rugby union then it would have found
liability established.
For Mrs Andersen, there was no uncertainty
about the possible consequences of inadequate
action on her part. If there was confusion about
safety instructions then it was obvious to any rea-
sonable person that disastrous consequences may
follow.
In two Australian cases67 heard at the same time
with similar circumstances to those seen in Hamstra,
two players, who had each suffered broken necks as
a result of collapsed scrums sued in negligence. The
defendants included, amongst others, certain indi-
vidual members of the International Rugby Foot-
ball Board (‘‘IRFB’’).68 Of some importance to the
case, in contrast to the finding in Watson v British
Board of Boxing Control69 was the emphasis placed
by the court on the possibility of virtually inde-
terminate liability. Gleeson C.J. stated70:
‘‘The extent of the potential liability is confined
only by the number of people who choose to
play the sport anywhere in the world . . . Such
63. Canadian Rugby Union.
64. The coach of the team that the claimant played
for—the standard applied was to act with the ordinary skill
and care of a selector/coach in the circumstances he found
himself in. It was further acknowledged that as long as he
acted in accordance with the Laws of the Game as promul-
gated by the CRU then he would have no reason to fear
liability.
65. At para.[19].
66. Hamstra v British Columbia Rugby Union, 1989 Carswell
B.C. 619 at para.[23]; 16 A.C.W.S. 3d 352.
67. Agar v Hyde; Agar v Worsley, 173 A.L.R. 665; 74 A.L.J.R.
1219.
68. The governing body of rugby union worldwide to
which all individual member bodies are affiliated.
69. [2001] Q.B. 1134.
70. Agar v Hyde, 201 C.L.R. 552 at 563; [2000] H.C.A. 41.
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an amateur sport may be played in many coun-
tries, in widely differing circumstances, rang-
ing from organised competitions to casual
games, by people of different ages, physical
abilities, vulnerabilities, and degrees of skill,
enthusiasm, recklessness and courage. It is said
that there is a duty, in relation to the rules of
the sport, to take reasonable care to protect
them all against unnecessary risk of injury. For
practical purposes, the liability is indetermi-
nate.’’
Whereas the possible number of litigants under the
British Boxing Board of Control ran to less than 500
people (the number of registered professional box-
ers in Great Britain), the numbers of would be liti-
gants in rugby union ran to hundreds of thousands
(potentially every person who plays rugby union
worldwide).
A further issue of importance was the inability of
identifiable individual members of the International
Board to bring about changes in the laws of the
game—clearly not an issue where Mrs Andersen
was concerned as she had sole power to apply and
amend any particular rule governing the event in
question.
Gaudron, McHugh, Grummow and Hayne JJ.
commented71:
‘‘No individual member of the Board could
bring about a change without the assent of oth-
ers. The most that an individual appellant
could do was make a proposal to a member
union or a committee of the Board and vote in
favour of any proposal that was put to the
Board. So the case against each member of the
IRFN must be that he owed a duty of care to
every person who played the game to propose
an amendment that would protect that player
from injury and, when such an amendment
was proposed, to vote for it. Presumably, the
IRFB member would have discharged his duty
of care by voting for the amendment even
though it was rejected by the majority of mem-
bers . . . Not only did no individual member of
the IRFB have the power to change the laws of
the game, the IRFB itself did not have the
power to ensure that the rules if promulgated
were adopted. The participation of individuals
in any particular match was regulated by what-
ever association organised the match . . . It fol-
lows that in no relevant sense did the Board of
the IRFB, or those who attended its meetings as
delegates control what happened in the
matches in which the respondents were
injured.’’
The voluntary nature of participation in rugby
union was further considered as another barrier to
any finding of liability. As the court summed
up72:
‘‘The decision to participate is made freely.
That freedom, or autonomy, is not to be dimin-
ished. But with autonomy comes responsibil-
ity. To hold that the appellants owed a duty of
care to Mr Worsley would diminish the auton-
omy of all who choose, for whatever reason, to
engage voluntarily in this, or any other, phys-
ically dangerous pastime. It would do so
because it would deter those who fulfil the
kind of role played by the IRFB and the appel-
lants in regulating that pastime from continu-
ing to do so lest they be held liable for the
consequences of the individual’s free choice.
The choices available to all would thus be
diminished.
Separate questions may arise about school
age children whose decisions are made or
affected by others.’’
The third case, again from Australia, involved an
injury received by a player in another game of
rugby union.73 The question arose as to whether or
not the defendants, New South Wales Rugby Union
Limited (‘‘NSWRU’’), owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff to organise and regulate the game so as not
to expose the plaintiff to unnecessary risk of injury.
The incident actually occurred in 1982, and once
again involved a front row forward breaking his
neck in an incorrectly engaged scrimmage, render-
ing the plaintiff paraplegic. An extensive analysis of
the Agar and Hyde case was carried out in which the
Court stressed the importance of the very nature of
the sport of rugby union. The judgment of the Chief
Justice was cited by Einstein J.74:
‘‘What is an unnecessary risk in an inherently
dangerous sport? When an obviously risky
activity is engaged in, voluntarily, for pleasure,
by an adult, how does a court determine
whether a certain level of risk is unneces-
sary . . . It cannot be the case that all avoidable
risks have to be eliminated. The only way to
avoid risk of injury is not to play. No doubt the
rules of the game could be altered in many
respects to make it safer, but people who enjoy
playing, or watching, rugby football have other
priorities.’’
Herein lies the fundamental difference between
these cases and the case under discussion. By no
71. Agar v Hyde; Agar v Worsley, 173 A.L.R. 665; 201 C.L.R.
552 at 580; [2000] H.C.A. 41.
72. 173 A.L.R. 665; 201 C.L.R. 552 at 283, [2000] H.C.A.
41.
73. Haylen v New South Wales Rugby Union Ltd [2002]
N.S.W.S.C. 114.
74. ibid., at p.10 of transcript.
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stretch of the imagination should Mrs Caldwell
have been exposed to the risk of being hit by an
oncoming car. If the road had indeed been closed
then no car would have been present to collide with
her. Equally, had the safety instructions stated that
it was a checkpoint rather than a road closure then
Mrs Caldwell would almost certainly have been
cycling on her own side of the road, and conse-
quently would not have collided with the vehicle in
question.
In the opinion of this author, the concerns voiced
earlier by James M. (see above) will prove to be
needless. The decisions in Hamstra v British Colum-
bia Rugby Union,75 Agar and Hyde v Worsley76 and
Haylen,77 should go some way towards soothing the
fears within the sports community in the wake of
the decision in Watson v British Boxing Board of Con-
trol.78 It is clear from that decision that liability was
limited to very restrictive circumstances and that
any responsible governing body (or event orga-
niser) maintaining reasonable vigilance with
regards to matters of safety provision within their
sport or event has nothing to fear from the courts.
If the instructions in the Andersen case had been
delivered with reasonable regard for competitor
safety then it is doubtful that Mrs Caldwell would
have perished in the race. Abbott D.C.J. acknowl-
edged this fact when addressing Mrs Andersen, he
stated79:
‘‘It is clear from the trial that cycle events
require careful planning. As a comparative
novice in that field, you made crucial decisions
about a checkpoint on the Summit Road to ena-
ble non-paying cyclists to be weeded out and
on the content of pre-race information, without
consulting with your experienced safety man-
ager. In my view, that was your most signifi-
cant failure.
As a result of ambiguous information given
by you, Mrs Caldwell thought the road was
closed and she was killed in a collision with a
car.’’
If the instructions had been clear Mrs Caldwell
would still be alive today.
There has been much concern expressed amongst
the sporting community in New Zealand about the
implications of this case. Abbott D.C.J. addressed
these concerns directly when he stated80:
‘‘There have been comments in the media that
the verdict on criminal nuisance is the death
knell on sporting culture in this country as we
know it. That is utter nonsense and nothing
could be further from the truth. There is no
reason whatever to suggest that people who
are involved in organised sport or other events
have any justified cause for alarm as a result of
this verdict.’’
This statement has clear echoes of that made by
Curtis J. at first instance in the case heard in Eng-
land involving the injury of a rugby player follow-
ing the collapse of a scrum and the subsequent
finding of liability in negligence against the referee
who officiated in that particular match81:
‘‘I see nothing objectionable in the law seeking
to prevent and protect rugby players from
unnecessary and potentially highly dangerous
if not lethal aspects of the game by the imposi-
tion of a duty of care. No responsible player
and no responsible referee has anything to
fear.’’
If this case has the effect of driving irresponsible
organisers out of the industry, then it will have
provided an outstanding service to all those who
organise and take part in such events. The decision
should thus be welcomed by all those involved in
the leisure and sports industry, rather than being
the object of fear and suspicion as seems to be the
case at present.
75. See n.66 above.
76. See n.71 above.
77. See n.73 above.
78. See n.69 above.
79. From Christchurch Press, August 30, 2003, reported on
www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,2643082a11,00.html.
80. ibid.
81. Smoldon v Whitworth [1997] E.L.R. 115; The Times, April
23, 1996, at p.5 of unreported transcript.
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